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COTTON PRICES
Remedies-The High Price of Cotton and the Breaching Farmer:
Liquidated Damages, Specific Performance and Other Remedies
During the 1973 cotton crop year in the southeastern United
States the price of cotton rose from approximately thirty cents per
pound to approximately ninety cents per pound between the spring and
fall. This was the fastest rise in more than a century. Consequently,
many farmers who had entered into cotton sales contracts1 in the spring
breached or sought to avoid these contracts in the fall in order to sell
their cotton on the open market. In the resulting lawsuits, many
farmers defended on the ground -that the liquidated damages clauses
in their contracts provided purchasers with their sole -remedy. There
are two main issues in these cases-whether the liquidated damages
clause is the exclusive remedy and, assuming a negative response to
the first question, whether the buyers are entitled to either specific per-
formance or actual damages.
One of the first of these so-called "cotton contract cases," Caro-
linas Cotton Growers Association, Inc. v. Arnette,2 involved farmers
who had signed marketing agreements with the plaintiff, an agricultural
cooperative, in which the farmers -agreed to sell and deliver to plaintiff
all the cotton produced on specified acreage. 3 The marketing agree-
ments were executed before the cotton crop was planted, and each con-
tained a liquidated damages clause. Each of the defendants refused
to deliver the cotton as contracted and some sold to third parties. The
1. These contracts are known in the trade as "forward contracts" because they
are made in the spring at or before the planting of the cotton crop, and establish the
price to be paid to the farmer for his cotton when it is harvested in the fall. Such con-
tracts have become common in recent years because they allow the farmer to know in
advance the price he will receive for his cotton. This knowledge benefits -the farmer
in two respects. He is able to determine in advance if it is economically wise for him
to plant, cultivate and harvest his crop in light of the price he is to receive. Also, the
farmer is relieved of the risk of loss in the event that cotton prices decrease prior to
the time for harvest.
These forward contracting arrangements also have advantages for the ultimate, if
not the immediate, purchaser, the textile manufacturer, because he knows the cost of his
raw material six to eight months prior to harvest. Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Arnette, 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974).
2. 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974). See also Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Law-
son, 377 F. Supp. 661 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
3. These 'Yorward contracts" usually cover all the cotton produced on specified
acreage rather than a certain number of bales; therefore, they are output contracts. It
should be noted, however, that the usual number of bales produced on a given farm is
a fairly constant figure unless some unexpected natural disaster occurs. 371 F. Supp.
at 66.
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plaintiff sought specific performance and the defendants contended
-that the liquidated damages clause in the contract provided plaintiff
with its exclusive remedy.
The court held that under the Uniform Commercial Code4 liqui-
dated damages were not the exclusive remedy available to plaintiff and
-that it was entitled to specific performance as provided by the South
Carolina Cooperative Marketing Act.5 This note will analyze the pos-
sible impact of Arnette with respect -to similar cases now pending,
particularly those in North Carolina."
Analysis of the Arnette case must begin by considering the ques-
tion of the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to "cotton
contracts." Article Two of the U.C.C. applies to sales and other
"transactions in goods."'7 In section 2-105(1) "goods" are defined to
include "growing crops." Sections 2-501(1)(c) and 9-204(2)(a)
clearly establish -that crops are considered as growing once they are
planted. Thus, a contract for the sale of a crop which is planted at
the time the contract is made is a contract for the sale of goods. s
Although the Arnette court in applying the U.C.C. to the liq-
uidated damages issue did not discuss the threshold question of
whether the U.C.C. applies to a contract for the sale of unplanted
crops, the language and purpose of section 2-105 support such an ap-
plication. "Goods" are defined in the first sentence of section 2-105
(1) as "things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale. . . .,,9 In extending the definition of goods
specifically to include "growing crops," the draftsmen intended that this
status again be defined as of "the time of identification," not as of the
time of the making of the contract. Since crops are not identified to
the contract until they begin growing,10 unplanted crops will be
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(1) (b).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-973 (1962).
6. Even though Arnette is a South Carolina case, North Carolina courts have
looked to cases in other states as a method of interpreting the Uniform Commercial
Code, remembering that one of the purposes of the U.C.C. is "to make uniform the law
among various jurisdictions." Evans v. W.B. Everett, Early & Winborne, Inc., 10 N.C.
App. 435, 437, 179 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1971), citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-102(2)(c)
(1965).
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
8. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Alturas Packing Co., 269 So. 2d 733 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (citrus fruit); Barron v. Edwards, 45 Mich. App. 210, 206 N.W.2d
508 (1973) (sod); Azevedo v. Minister, 86 Nev. 576, 471 P.2d 661 (1970) (hay).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-105(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
10. "In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs . . . (c) when the
crops are planted or otherwise become growing crops . . . . " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-501(1) (c).
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growing crops at the time of identification and are thus "goods." 1
Under U.C.C. section 2-105(2), unplanted crops, like unpro-
duced manufactured articles, are "future goods," for they are not yet
in existence and identified to the contract. Official Comment Two to
this section makes clear that contracts to sell future goods are covered
by the U.C.C.
As noted previously, many, though not -all, cotton sales contracts
contain liquidated damages clauses. 12  The U.C.C. clearly answers the
question of whether such clauses are presumed to be exclusive reme-
dies. Section 2-719(1)(b) provides that resort to a contract remedy
is optional unless expressly provided to be exclusive. Official Com.
ment Two to this section further states that, if the parties intend a con-
tract term to describe a sole remedy, "this must be clearly expressed."
Together, these two provisions compel the conclusion that a contract
remedy is not exclusive unless the agreement so specifies.13
Even if an agreement does not expressly make liquidated damages
the sole remedy, thus permitting the injured party to seek an equitable
remedy, 14 a valid liquidated damages clause apparently will preclude
the injured party from seeking his actual damages. The general rule
under pre-Code law was that a valid liquidated damages clause substi-
tuted the amount agreed upon for the actual damages resulting from
the breach of the contract. 5 There is no compelling reason to believe
that section 2-719(l)(b) alters that rule; it simply makes clear that
11. This interpretation is supported by the fact that it does not distinguish between
crops and manufactured goods. Manufactured articles that have not been produced at
the time the contract is made are "goods" under section 2-105(1) because they will be
movable when they are identified to the contract. There is no policy reason for the
Code to cover unproduced manufactured articles but to exclude unplanted crops. More-
over, it is too important and unusual a distinction to have been made without clearer
delineation in the Code itself and without any explanation in the comments to the Code.
See Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Lawson, 377 F. Supp. 661 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
12. Such clauses are found most often in contracts involving marketing associations
such as Carolinas Cotton Growers Association, Inc. Obviously, if there is no liquidated
damages clause in the contract, the main issue will be whether the non-breaching plain-
tiff is entitled to specific performance, or some other equitable remedy, or to the re-
covery of his actual damages.
13. Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Arnette, 371 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D.S.C.
1974). See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 378 (1932).
14. Such an equitable remedy might be specific performance or an. injunction for-
bidding sales to third parties. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716(1).
15. See. e.g., Quaile & Co. v. William Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d
369 (1931); Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); U-Haul Co. of
N.C., Inc. v. Jones, 269 N.C. 284, 152 S.E.2d 65 (1967) (holding that a liquidated dam-
ages clause will not preclude an equitable remedy but does settle the amount of damages
if there is a suit for such).
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non-damage remedies are not precluded."0 Furthermore, some courts
have held that the U.C.C. allows the injured party to recover actual
damages if liquidated damages have not been stipulated. 17  By infer-
ence, if liquidated damages are stipulated, the Code would not permit
recovery of actual damages despite section 2-719(l)(b). Therefore,
an injured party seeking damages is limited to the amount stipulated
in the liquidated damages clause, unless he can show that the clause
itself is invalid.
A liquidated damages clause must meet two requirements in order
to be enforceable. First, the damages that the parties might reasonably
anticipate from a breach must be incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation. Secondly, the amount stipulated must be either a reason-
able estimate of -the damages that would probably be caused by a
breach or reasonably proportionate to the damages actually caused by
the breach.:
8
Liquidated damages clauses are most frequently attacked on the
theory that the damages stipulated are excessive and therefore consti-
tute an unenforceable penalty.' 9 In the recent cotton contract cases,
the liquidated damages, if provided for, have been disproportionately
small, especially if actual damages are to be measured by the market
price-contract price differential. Some courts and authorities have
held that an unreasonably small amount of liquidated damages consti-
tutes a penalty and therefore does not bind the parties.20  However,
16. An argument could be made that section 2-719(1) (b) does not preclude dam-
age remedies either. Section 2-719(1) (b) provides that resort to a contract remedy is
optional unless the agreement expressly provides for the contrary. Assuming no such
express language, if an injured party chooses not to seek -the contract remedy, in this
case liquidated damages, he should be able to seek any available alternative remedy, in-
cluding actual damages, computed according to section 2-713, for example. Holding that
he may not seek actual damages in effect would mean that the liquidated damages clause
is exclusive.
17. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16
N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965); Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza As-
sociates, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
18. Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968); Bradshaw v. Milli-
kin, 173 N.C. 432, 92 S.E. 161 (1917); REsrATE ENT OF CoNTRAc'rs § 339 (1932).
19. Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968); City of Kinston v.
Suddreth,'266 N.C. 618, 620, 146 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1966); UNwopml COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-718(l). For discussions of factors influencing the determination of whether a con-
tract term is a penalty see Knutton v. Cofield, supra; Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N.C.
432, 92 S.E. 161 (1917); Henderson v. Cansler, 65 N.C. 542 (1871); Lindsay v. Anes-
ley, 28 N.C. 186 (1845).
20. Horn v. Poindexter, 176 N.C. 620, 622, 97 S.E. 653 (1918) ("[w]here the
stipulated sum to be paid in a breach of the contract is of such a nature that the damages
arising from a breach may be either much greater or much less than the sum fixed it
will be construed to be a penalty."); BENDEs's UCC Stov., R. Duns_ ERo & L. KaN,
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the North Carolina Supreme Court arguably disagreed with this theory
in City of Kinston v. Suddreth.2 1  There, plaintiff attacked the stipu-
lated contract damages as a penalty in order to recover his actual dam-
ages that exceeded the penalty. 22  The court, -however, refused -to de-
termine whether the stipulated sum in, the contract was a penalty,
noting that the result would be the same regardless of -the classification.
"If a provision denominated liquidated damages be deemed one for a
penalty, 'the measure of damages is compensation for the actual loss,
not exceeding the penalty named.' ,,23 A close analysis of Suddreth,
however, suggests that an earlier North Carolina case was more precise
and reached a better result.
24
Even when stipulated damages are not declared invalid as a
penalty, a liquidated damages provision may still be declared invalid
if damages from breach were easily ascertainable 25 at the -time the con-
tract was executed.2" If a formula or some other method of calculating
SALES AND BuLK TRANSFERS, § 14.08, at 64 (1974). See UNORm CoMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-718, Comment 1.
21. 266 N.C, 618, 146 S.E.2d 660 (1966). But see Horn v. Poindexter, 176 N.C.
620, 622, 97 S.E. 653 (1918).
22.- This same allegation could be made in a cotton contract case.
23. 266 N.C. at 621, 146 S.E.2d at 662, quoting Wheedon v. American Bonding
& Trust Co., 128 N.C. 69, 71, 38 S.E. 255 (1901).
24. See note 20 supra. For three reasons the impact of Suddreth should be lim-
ited: (1) The strong reliance that the court placed upon Wheedon v. American Bond-
ing & Trust Co., 128 N.C. 69, 38 S.E. 255 (1901), appears to be misplaced. Wheedon,
which involved the liability of a surety on his bond, stated: "In an action on a penal
bond for the perforcance [sic] of a contract, equity always interposes to relieve, and
the measure of damages is compensation for actual loss, not exceeding the penalty
named." Suddreth, however, did not even acknowledge the possible distinctions between
liquidated damages and bond liability.
(2) If Suddreth had been decided under the U.C.C., the same result would prob-
ably have been reached, i.e. the liquidated damages would have been awarded on the
theory that they were "reasonable in the light of the ... actual harm caused by the
breach ... ." Uwopa ComitRCIs CODE § 2-718(1). Therefore, the issue -that the
court avoided-whether the stipulated amount was liquidated damages or a penalty-
would have been found to be valid liquidated damages.
(3) Suddreth ignored the possibility that an unreasonably small stipulated sum in
a contract might constitute a penalty and thus might not bind the parties, as was recog-
nized in Horn v. Poindexter, 176 N.C. 620, 97 S.E. 653 (1918). In fact it might be
argued that Suddreth was concerned with the term "penalty" only in the context of un-
reasonably high stipulated damages. Thus, the holding in Suddreth might not apply to
a "penalty" that is unreasonably low. Such a theory would reconcile Suddreth and
Wheedon with the authorities cited in note 20 supra.
25. See, e.g., Horn v. Poindexter, 176 N.C. 620, 97 S.E. 653 (1918); Winston-
Salem Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 284, 53 S.E. 885
(1906); Thoroughgood v. Walker, 47 N.C. 16 (1854); UNIwoRM CoMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-718(1); 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 218 (1965); RESTATE MET OF CONTRACTS §
339(l)(b) (1932).
26. The time of execution, not the time of the breach, is the proper -time for deter-
mining whether damages were ascertainable. Robbins v, Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W.
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and ascertaining damages is available, the liquidated damages usually
will be held invalid.2 7  For example, some courts have held that, with
a contract for the sale of goods having a readily available market price,
damages for breach are ascertainable by applying the contract price-
market price differential rule,28 -therefore invalidating the liquidated
damages clause.
29
As previously mentioned, a valid liquidated damages clause will
not prevent the injured party from seeking the equitable remedy of
specific performance absent express language in the contract to the
contrary.30 U.C.C. section 2-716(1) provides: "Specific performance
may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper circum-
stances." While this language is vague, it is clear that the draftsmen
desired to increase the availability of specific performance as a rem-
edy.31 If specific performance would have been available under prior
law, it is available under the Code.3 2  Under pre-Code law, specific
performance was granted only in the "absence of an adequate and com-
plete remedy at law.' 33  Although courts have been particularly willing
to grant specific performance of output contracts, 34 such as the cotton
contracts in issue, such a grant has not been automatic. 5
1027 (1927); Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v. Racso, Inc., 201 Misc. 1087, 107
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Knapp v. Ottinger, 206 Okla. 113, 240 P.2d 1083 (1951).
27. See, e.g., Plymouth Sec. Co. v. Johnson. 335 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1960); City of
St. Louis v. Parker-Washington Co., 271 Mo. 229, 196 S.W. 767 (1917); Horn v. Poin-
dexter, 176 N.C. 620, 97 S.E. 653 (1918); Wilson v. Dealy, 222 Tenn. 196, 434 S.W.2d
835 (1968); Schwarz v. Lee, 287 S W. 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-713.
29. Home Land & Cattle Co. v. McNamara, 145 F. 17 (7th Cir. 1906) (contract
for the sale of cattle); Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498 (1941); Stark v.
Shemada, 187 Cal. 785, 204 P. 214 (1922) (contract for the sale of furniture); Marshall
Milling Co. v. Rosenbluth, 231 Ill. App. 325 (1924); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Beyer,
168 Mo. App. 686, 153 S.W. 794 (1913) (contract for the sale of threshing machines).
See Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84 (1972). But see
Calvin Hosmer, Stolte Co. v. Paramount Cone Co., 285 Mass. 278, 189 N.E. 192 (1934)
(contract for the sale of flour).
30. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(1)(b); see, e.g., Tobacco Growers Co-
operative Ass'n v. Pollock, 187 N.C. 409, 121 S.E. 763 (1924); Tobacco Growers Co-
operative Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N.C. 265, 117 S.E. 174 (1923); Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173
N.C. 432, 436, 92 S.E. 161, 163 (1917). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 378
(1932).
31. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, Comment 1; id. § 1-106(1).
32. Id. §§ 1-103, 2-716, Comment I.
33. Annot., 152 A.L.R. 4, 47 (1944).
34. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1419B (3d ed. 1968);
Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance, 40 N.C.L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1961).
35. In determining the adequacy of the remedy in damages, as to contracts
other than for the transfer of an interest in land, the following factors are in-
fluential and may singly or in combination justify specific enforcement: (a)
the degree of difficulty and uncertainty in making an accurate valuation of the
subject matter involved, in determining the effect of a breach, and in estimating
584 [Vol. 53
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In North Carolina specific performance of contracts for the sale
and delivery of personal property normally would not be granted, but
it was granted when damages did not afford a complete remedy.""
Several North Carolina cases in the 1920's, analogous to the present
cotton contract cases, involved forward contracts, containing liquidated
damages clauses, for the sale and delivery of tobacco.17  The farmers
later breached the contracts and attempted to sell their tobacco else-
where. When the purchasers sued for specific performance, defend-
ants contended that the liquidated damages clauses provided the ex-
clusive remedy. However, the courts held that despite the liquidated
damages clauses, plaintiffs were in effect entitled to specific perform-
ance in the form of an injunction forbidding the farmers from deliver-
ing the tobacco to anyone other than plaintiff.38
Since specific performance was available under pre-Code law, it
should be granted under the U.C.C. in the present cases.39 Further,
recent authorities suggest that a party should be granted specific per-
formance when the equities strongly favor him, regardless of whethcr
such a remedy would have been appropriate under pre-Code law. 40  In
the plaintiff's harm; (b) the existence of sentimental associations and esthetic
interests, not measurable in money, that would be affected by breach; (c) the
difficulty, inconvenience, or impossibility of obtaining a duplicate or substan-
tial equivalent of the promised performance by means of money awarded as
damages; (d) the degree of probability that damages awarded cannot in fact
be collected; (e) the probability that full compensation cannot be had without
multiple litigation.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 361 (1932).
36. Virginia Trust Co. v. Webb, 206 N.C. 247, 173 S.E. 598 (1934); Tobacco
Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. Battle, 187 N.C. 260. 121 S.E. 629 (1924).
37. The courts did not rely on a marketing act in reaching their decisions as did
the court in Arnette, despite the fact that an agricultural cooperative was involved.
38. Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. Pollock, 187 N.C. 409, 121 S.E. 763
(1924); Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. Battle, 187 N.C. 260, 121 S.E. 629
(1924); Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N.C. 265, 117 S.E. 174
(1923); see Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (injunc-
tion); Fraser v. Cohen, 159 Fla. 253, 31 So. 2d 463 (1947) (specific performance);
Thompson v. Winterbottom, 154 Md. 581, 141 A. 343 (1928) (specific performance and
injunction); Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 NJ. Eq. 831, 66 A. 935 (Ch. 1907) (specific
performance and injunction). Contra, Heam v. Ruark, 148 Md. 354, 129 A. 366
(1925) (injunction denied, damages adequate). See also Van Hecke, supra note 34, at
4-5.
39. See text accompanying note 32 supra. In addition, the U.C.C. extends the
availability of this equitable remedy to cases in which securing substitute goods is sub-
jectively, highly difficult rather than objectively, virtually impossible. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, Comment 2; Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Re-
lating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 232-33 (1963).
40. Hale v. Higginbotham, 228 Ga. 823, 188 S.E.2d 515 (1972); Schweber v. Ral-
lye Motors, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Comment, Specific
Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code-What "Other
Proper Circumstances"?, 33 U. Prr. L. REv. 243 (1971).
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the present cases the equities appear to favor the purchasers. First,
the farmers are the breaching parties. Secondly, their sole reason for
breaching was to enable them to obtain higher prices on the open mar-
ket. Thirdly, in most cases the buyers, in reliance on the farmers'
promises -to deliver, entered second contracts with textile manufactur-
ers for -the sale and delivery of the cotton. The Arnette court further
suggests -that cotton contracts may be specifically enforced due to -the
"unusual interdependency of the various persons handling cotton from




Arnette properly applied the U.C.C. and held the liquidated dam-
ages clause not to be an exclusive remedy. For those currently pend-
ing cotton contract cases involving similar factual situations in jurisdic-
tions that have marketing acts similar to those in South Carolina and
North Carolina, Arnette represents valid precedent for awarding speci-
fic performance. Whether specific performance will be available to
non-agricultural-cooperative plaintiffs depends on interpretation of the
U.C.C. and pre-Code case law. Fortunately for such plaintiffs the
U.C.C. favors 'the granting of specific performance. 42 Indeed, the
simple, equitable solution to these cases would be -to grant such relief
in the absence of a contract term permitting the farmer an election to
perform or to pay liquidated damages.43 This solution is based pri-
marily on the axiom that a man should be required to perform any
arms-length agreement that he enters, even when it later proves to be
a bad bargain.
DANIEL BLUE DEAN
41. 371 F. Supp. at 70.
42. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
43. Bell v. Smith Concrete Prods., Inc., 263 N.C. 389, 139 S.E.2d 629 (1965).
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